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When  lenders participate voluntarily in  a  buyback of  debt
claims,  both the price paid for repurchased claims  and the
secondary market price of the remaining debt rise  - so all
creditors realize a net benefit. In contrast, the menu approach to
debt reduction allows the debtor to reduce its debt at cheaper
prices.
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When sovereign debt trades at a discount on  from the menu be assigned to each lender.
secondary markets, a market buyback increases  Instead, it implemcnts debt reduction through a
the secondary market price. The wealth of  price system, allowing different creditors to
private creditors increases because part of the  select diffcrent portfolios in equilibrium from a
funds used in the repurchase is a transfer pay-  common set of options.
ment to them.
With heterogeneous banks, some resources
This transfer of resources can be mitigated  will be transferred when participation in the debt
by imposing a capital gains tax on the remaining  reduction plan is voluntary - and the buyback
debt. Diwan and Kletzer show how this can be  price will generally need to be higher than the
achieved by including exit and new-money  prebuyback price.
options in a menu of options from which credi-
tors can frecly choose. The menu approach  Diwan and Kletzer illustrate some of their
imposes an implicit tax on the capital gains on  rcsults by analyzing the reccnt Mexican debt
the remaining debt by requiring lenders that do  agreement. They show how to read through the
not exit to extend ncw loans in proportion to the  complex financial acrobatics to estimate the net
debt they retain.  debt reduction. Funds provided by intemational
financial institutions beneflted both Mexico and
It is enough to make the buyback price equal  its creditors. Mexico directly retained about 62
to the earlier predeal price.  Any new-money call  percent of these resources and the banks 34
will do the job.  In equilibrium, creditors will  percent.
provide enough new money to stabilizc the post-
deal price at a level that Ieaves them indifferent  When creditors are heterogeneous and
to the exit option.  Increasing the new money call  possess private information about the value of
increascs the cost of the menu as wcll as the  debt reductio.. .o them, a mechanism is needed to
cxtent of the debt reduction achieved.  elicit that information. Researchers should
analyze how a menu can be combined with an
The menu approach Diwan and Kletzcr  auction of new money or exit instruments to
describe does not require that particular choices  elicit that inforrnation.
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A reduction in the nominal debt burden of a sovereign  whose debt
trades at a discount on secondary markets leads to a rise in the secondary
market price. Dooley (1987)  argues that if debt is repurchase1  by the borrower
on the secondary  market, then the price that must be paid is the equilibrium
price of debt claims after the  borrower's indebtedness is reduced. If any
lender can choose between selling debt claims back to the debtor and retaining
those claims, then his opportunity cost for selling is the secondary market
price after the debt reduction.  Therefore,  when lender  participation in a
buyback of debt claims is  voluntary, both the price paid for repurchased
claims and the secondary market price of remaining debt rise, so that all
creditors realize a net benefit. The amount received from the sale of debt
plus the ex post value of remaining  debt exceeds the ex ante value of the
original outstanding debt. 1
When a debt buyback is financed using the debtor country's reserves or
a concessionary loan or official aid from abroad, there is a transfer of part
of the funds used in the repurchase to the private creditors. The transfer
from the party providing the resources for the buyback to the private
creditors is an undesirable consequence  of equilibrium under the simple
repurchase program. But this transfer of resources can be mitigated by
imposing a capital gains tax on remaining  debt. If a tax is levied on the
remaining debt, then the opportunity cost to lenders of selling their debt
claims is reduced for any given net repurchase.  The equilibrium buyback price
will be less than the ex post equilibrium  secondary market price by the
capital gains (specific)  tax rate on debt claims remaining after debt
reduction.  There is a tax rate such that the equilibrium price of repurchased
debt is the ex ante secondary market price of the debt. The tax revenue
1Equivalently,  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that in a market repurchase that
marginal buybacks occur at the average cost of  debt service while they only
reduce the debt burden by the marginal cost of  debt service, which is smaller.-2-
.ollected  will  be positive  if the  debt  reduction  raises  the  secondary  market
price.  While  explicit  taxation  of creditors'  gains  may  be politically  or
legally  infeasible,  there  may  be alternative  schemes  to impose  such  taxes  on
the  capital  gains  realized  by debt-holders  during  a buyback.
Recently,  attempts  have  been  made  to reduce  the  external  debt  overhang
of some  highly  indebted  countries  by negotiating  a  menu  of options  from  which
the  creditor  will select  latez.  An agreed  upon  menu is  a contract,  that  may  be
partly  implicit,  establishing  a future  opportunity  set  for  the  lenders.  An
improvement  upon the  status  quo is  possible  only  if some  degree  of  contract
enforcement  is available.  The  menu  approach  requires  that  lenders  can  commit
to choose  from  amongst  a restricted  set  of actions  ex  post.  The  possible  means
for  enforcing  a  menu include  creditor  country  legal  and  political  institutions
and  agreements  between  creditor  nations.  By agreeing  to the  contract,  lenders
face  the  possibility  that  they  will  be penalized  for  reneging  ex  post  by
refusing  to  allocate  their  existing  debt  claims  across  a por.folio  using  the
menu  options.  Agreement  to a  menu  of options  ex ante  can  be  voluntary  and  may
be necessary  for  political  or,  even,  legal  reasons.  While  private  creditors
restrict  their  options  ex post,  they  may  be able  to  raise  their  net  worth  in
negotiations.  That  is,  lenders  can increase  the  value  of their  loan  portfolios
ex ante  by agreeing  to  choose  from  a  menu  of restricted  options  ex post.
A menu  approach  can  be used  to impose  an implicit  tax  on the  capital
gains  on the  remaining  debt.  Such  a tax  can  be set  by requiring  lenders  to
extend  new loans  in  proportion  to  the  debt  they  retain.  In some  of the  recent
menu  negotiations,  the  options  have  included  selling  back  debt  claims  and
retaining  them  with  a pledge  of new  money.  Because  debt  trades  at a discount,
a  portion  of any  new  money  spent  to  purchase  a  new  debt  of  equal  face  value
represents  a tax.  That  is,  if  a dollar  is  lent  and  the  secondary  price  is-3-
sixty  cents,  then  the  new  debt  claim  is  worth  sixty  cents  and  the  rest  is  a
tax  with the  revenue  accruing  to the  debtor.  A commitment  to  provide  new  loans
in  proportion  to  retained  debt  creates  a  wedge  between  the  price  paid  to
buyback  debt  and  the  secondary  price  of debt  after  debt  is  reduced.
Below,  we discuss  how  concerted  arrangements  for  debt  reduction  can  be
devised  which  eliminate  the  transfer  of debtor  or donor  resources  to  private
debt  holders.  The  menu  approach  we describe  does  not  require  assignment  of
particular  choices  from  the  menu  to  each  lender.  The  menu  offers  a  set  of
prices  for  different  options  which  implement  a decentralized  equilibrium  ex
post.  Commitments  to  accept  a menu  of  options  including  new loans  and  debt
forgiveness  along  with  repurchases  may  be enforceable.  We assume  below  that
private  creditors  do not  need  to  accept  a menu  over  the  status  quo,  but that
once  they  do,  reneging  is costly.
The  interaction  between  debt  buybacks  and  the  provision  of  new funds
has lead  to confusing  statements  in  the  debt  literature.  For  example,  SaT-hs
(1989)  states  that  money  center  banks  "gain  by having  the  small  banks  cash in
and  accept  losses  by exit  bonds,  secondary  sales  and  so on.  Since  any  cred;
is  made  better  off  if  another  creditor  voluntarily  makes  a  concession  to the
debtor,  the  large  banks  have an  added  incentive  to let  the  small  bank get  out
at a loss,  while  the  big  bank  postpones  any  significant  concession.'  Cline
(1989)  argues  that  new  money  is  needed  in the  Brady  type  deals  "to  help
finance  the  interest  coming  due  on the  unconverted  debt."  Both  authors  ignore
the  important  link  between  the  size  of the  new  money  call  and  the  equilibrium
price  of  repurchased  debt.
2.  The  Effect  of  Pure  Market  Buybacks
Sovereign  borrowers  choose  to  service  external  debt  obligations
because  it is in  their  enlightened  self-interest  to  do so.  Under  sovereign-4-
immunity,  cr( itors  do not  have recourse  to  an international  court  to assure
settlement  of debts  through  a  direct  lien  on the  country's  assets  as they
would  in the  case  of an insolvent  domestic  client.  The  threat  E the
imposition  of sanctions  in the  event  of  non-payment  or insufficient  payment
provides  sovereigns  with  the  incentive  to  make  debt  payments.  In  addition  to
denials  of future  official  aid  flows,  the  penalties  for  default  include
restrictions  on the  future  trading  opportunities  on international  markets  for
the  debtor.  These  include  the  disruption  of commodity  trade,  suspension  of
trade  preferences,  and  reduced  access  to international  financial  markets.
Because  the  repayments  made  by a  sovereign  lebtor  are  linked  to the  expected
present  value  of the  social  cost  of sanctions,  they  need  not  be strictly
proportional  to the  total  outstanding  contractual  debt  burden.  Moreover,  as
the  probability  of sanctions  being  exercised  (or  being  used  by creditors  as a
threat  to  extract  higher  net  repay.-ents)  increases,  debtor  countries  can  take
actions  to reduce  the  effectiveness  of sanctiorns,  for  example  by
underinvesting,  or  by shifting  resources  to the  non-tradable  and  to the  import
competing  sectors  of the  economy.2
In this  paper,  we summarize  the  various  arguments  made  by the  recent
debt  literature  by assuming  that  the  present  value  of expected  debt  service
payments  is  an increasing  and  concave  function  of nominal  debt  burden,  that
is,  we take  the  value  of debt  to  be a smooth  function  f(D),  where  f(D)  is  the
value  of the  total  debt  claim,  D, and  f"'D)  < 0 for  all  D  >  0. The  marginal
price  of  debt,  f'(D),  can  be positive  or  negative,  although  we will  assume  it
is  positive:  if the  present  value  curve  is  first  upward,  then  downward
sloping,  none  of the  arguments  below  is  changed. 3
To illustrate  the  costs  of  market-based  buybacks,  suppose  that  the
2See  Diwan  (forthcoming).
3Similarly,  our  main  arguments  hold  if the  debt  value  function  is  not  smooth.-5-
initial  debt  is Do  and  that  an amount  of funds,  a  <  Do  is  made  available  for  a
debt  buyback.  If the  options  available  to creditors  are to  sell  debt  or  simply
hang  onto  debt,  the  secondary  market  price  of  debt  will  rise  from  p0 -
f(Do)/DO  to  p 1 - f(DO-(a/pj))/[Do-(a/p 1)], where  a/p 1 is  the  face  value  of the
debt  reduced.  Because  f(x)  is  concave,  p1 exceeds  po  for  a  >  0. The  ex post
value  of creditor  assets  is:
pl(Do  - a/p 1) +  a  - p1DO  >  poDo  - f(DO)
The  capital  gain  realized  by the  creditors  retaining  claims  is:
(p- - po)(Do  - a/p 1) >  0
The  percentage  gain  received  by those  who  sell  claims  and those  who  retain
them  is equal.
When  contracts  that  bind the  actions  of private  creditors  are feasible
and  credible,  the  conversion  of the  sLacus  quo  debt  claims  to a  package  of
assets  that  has  expected  present  value  at least  as great  can  be negotiated.  We
assume  that  enforcement  of an agreement  by private  creditors  with their  home
governments  and  international  financial  institutions  is  possible  but that
creditors  do  not  need  to accept  a contract  which  reduces  the  present  value  of
their  assets.  Once  an agreement  is reached,  lenders  face  penalties  if they
refuse  to  perform  according  to  the  contract  (in  the  recent  Mexico  deal  for
example,  creditors  that  did  not  participate  were  effectively  made  junior;  see
section  7).  If enforcement  of a contract  is only  possible  for  a subset  of the
creditors,  then  a debt  reduction  menu  can  still  be negotiated  involving  these
creditors  alone.  However,  the  non-participants  free  ride,  realizing  a net-6-
increase  in  the  value  of t.heir  portfolios.  The  participating  creditors  can
still  increase  the  value  of their  assets  despite  providing  pecuniary  external
benefits  to the  non-participants.  For  simplicity,  we assume  that  the  entire
stock  of outstanding  claims  is  represented  in the  negotiations.
3.  Simple  Menus:  Relend  or Exit
To illustrate  the  role  of a  menu  of  options  for  creditors  to choose
amongst,  suppose  that  creditor  banks  are  presented  with  a simple  menu  of
options  represented  by the  pair (p,  n):  for  each  dollar  of claim  they  hold,
banks  can  choose  between  exiting  at  a price  of p, and  relending  n dollars.
Given  a  menu (p,  n),  can  we tell  how  much  debt  reduction,  B, and  how
much  new  money,  N, will  actually  be achieved?  Somehow  surprisingly,  :he  answer
is  yes.  More  precisely,  when "sufficient"  funds  are  available  for  debt
reduction,  competition  between  banks  insures  a unique  equilibrium.  To see
that,  let  Di  stand  for  debt  stocks  and  Pi  for  debt  prices,  i  - (1,2),  where
period  t-1  refers  to  the  level  of the  variables  before  the  debt  deal,  and t=2
after  the  deal  is  completed.  We  have:
(1)  D1 - Do  - B +  N
(2)  Pi  - f(Di)  /  Di
(3)  n - N / (Di  - N)
Lenders  choose  between  the  two  option  in  a  manner  that  maximizes  the
value  of their  assets  subject  to the  terms  of the  menu (p,  n).  After  the  deal
is completed,  debt  prices  are  expected  to  be higher  at  p1 >  p. This  encourages
relending  as a  bank  that  relends  n dollars,  will  have its  old  claim  revalued.-7-
However,  its  new  claim  n  will  be only  valued  at  p1, implying  a capital  lcss  of
(1 - p1). Thus,  the  opportunity  cost  for  holding  a  unit  of debt  back from
repurchase  at price  p is  pl(l  +  n) - n. This  implies  that  when  p 1 exceeds
(p  + n) / (1  +  n),  the  new  money  option  is  preferred  to  the  exit  option.  Thus,
less  debt  will  be sold  and  more  new  money  offered,  resulting  ir less  than
expected  debt  reduction.  This  leads  to an increase  in  D1 (using  equation  1),
and  thus  to  a reduction  in  p 1 (using  equation  2).  Since  creditors  are  price
takers  when  they  optimize  ex post,  and  because  the  expected  present  value  of
debt  function,  f(x)  is strictly  concave,  the  solution  to  portfolio  value
maximization  by creditors  is  unique.  In equilibrium,  we must  then  have:
(4)  p, - (p  + n)  / (1  + n)
The  system  of equation  (1)  to (4)  can  be solved  for  B ,  N, D1 and  p 1 in  terms
of any menu (p ,  n).
Let  us focus  on the  menus  that  leave  the  commercial  banks  indifferent
with  the  status  quo.  Those  menus  are  simply  characterized  by:
(5)  P  Po-
Equation  (5)  insures  that  banks  are  indifferent  between  exiting  at  p and  the
initial  status  quo  vaiued  at p 0. In equilibrium,  equation  (4)  insures  that
they  are  also  indifferent  between  the  initial  status  quo  and  the  relending
option.  We show  below  that  as n increases,  so  does  the  ex post  debt  price  p 1.
Thus,  there  is  a maximum  n above  which  p 1 reaches  1.  What is remarkable  is
that  any  menu (p 0, n),  with  n positive  and  smaller  than  n, will  produce  an
equilibrium  in  which  all  the  banks,  whether  they  exit  or  relend  retain  a-8-
payoff  exactly  equal  to  po.  Thus,  the  menu  effectively  eliini-ates  any  transfer
of resources  to  the  creditors  that  could  arise  from  the  debt  reduction
operation.  Moreover,  knowledge  of the  function  f(D)  is  not  needed  to  construct
menus  that  allow  for  debt  reduction  -jith  no transfer  of resources  to
creditors.
Equations  (4)  and (5)  insure  that  the  post-deal  price,  p 1, will  be
higher  than  the  ex ante  price,  p0. The  result  that  p1 exceeds  p 0 while  the
buyback  price  is  po  way  create  some  confusion.  Why  is some  debt  sold  at po
when  the  temaining  lebt  clainis  rise  in  value  to  p1? The  choice  between  the
options  of selling  debt  or staying  in is  voluntary,  but  there  is  a tax  to
staying  in.  This  tax  is  exactly  the  difference,  (p 1 - po),  per  unit  of
remaining  debt.  With  a positive  tax,  the  post-tax  price  must rise  if  the  ex
ante  value  of lenders'  assets  does  not  fall.  Private  creditors  are indifferent
in  equilibrium  between  selling  an additional  unit  of debt  and  retaining  afn
extra  unit  of debt  since  the  net  value  of a  unit  of debt  held  back is  equal  to
the  price  paid  in  repurchase.
How  does  the  equilibrium  amount  of debt  reduction  vary  as the  new
money  call  is increased?  To answer  this  question,  we must  determine  how  D
varies  with  n.  Using  equations  (1)  to (5),  we get:
(6)  f(D 1) /D 1'D  (po  +  n) /  (1  +  n)
For  any  n, equation  (6)  car ,e  solved  for  D1(n).  Differentiating  (6)  with
respect  to  n and  rearranging,  we get:
(7)  8D1/On  - - [D,/(l+n)]  [(1  - p1) /  (p 1 - f'(D 1))] <  0-9-
Thus,  as  n increases,  the  equilibrium  amount  of remaining  debt  falls.
Although  a-priori  counter-intuitive,  this  result  illustrates  well  the  effect
of equilibrium  considerations  applied  to  free  choice  among  a menu.  As the  new
money  call,  n, is increased,  the  exit  option  becomes  more  desirable  than  the
relending  option.  But in  equilibrium,  both  options  must  be equally  desirable.
As a result,  it  becomes  necessary  to  achieve  larger  debt  reductions  in  order
to  boost  the  ex  post  debt  price  p 1, and  thus  increase  the  attractiveness  of
the  relending  option.
4. Cost  of  Debt  Reduction
If  funds,  a, are  supplied  by a third  party  seeking  to  benefit  the
debtor,  then  a  package  that  effectively  taxes  in full  the  capital  gains  of
lenders  assures  that  a net  t.ansfer  is  not  made  to  the  creditors.  Lenders
can  agree  to choose  between  selling  debt  back  to  the  debtor  and  holding  claims
with the  obligation  to  provide  new  loans 4. A  menu that  costs  exactly  a
resources  can  be designed  to ensure  that  lenders  are  indifferent  between  the
two  options  and  their  status  quo  payoff  if  the  relationship  between  the
present  value  of debt  and  the  face  value  of debt,  f(x),  is  known.
IrT  general,  the  new  loans  forthcoming  under  the  relending  option  can
be used  by the  debtor  country  either  for  domestic  absorption  or for  further
debt  repurchases.  If they  are  used  for  buybacks,  then  the  debt is  reduced  by
more  and  the  tax  rate,  n, should  be  higher  since  the  secondary  market  price
rises  further.  We extend  the  analysis  here  to  exam'ine  the  effect  of  a  and  of
the  share  of new  loans  retained  by the  country  for  domestic  absorption  on the
types  of mentus  that  can  be negotiated.
Suppose  now  that  N is  the  total  of new  loans  made  by the  remaining
4With  no loss  of generality,  we assume  that  new  and  old  loans  have  equivalent
terms  and  that  interest  payments  occur  just  before  the  debt  agreements.  More
generally,  new  money  can  be interpreted  as part  rescheduling.-10-
creditors  and  p is the  part  of the  new financing,  (N+a),  that  is  kept  by the
deLLor  country  to finance  domestic  absorption.  We assume  that  the  net  resource
transfer  to the  country,  p, is  a  monotone  'ncreasing  function  of (N+a).  The
amount  of new  funds  used  to repurchase  debt  is (N+a-p),  so  that  after  the  debt
reduction  program,  the  remaining  debt  is  given  by:
(8)  D1 - Do - [(a  +  N  - -)Ip  I  +  N,
where  p is  the  price  paid  in the  buyback.  To assure  that  creditors  receive  no
net surplus,  we let  p equal  p0 - f(DO)/DO.  In equilibrium,  we have:
(9)  N*  +  f(DO)  - (a  +  N*  - p)  +  f(D1*).
where  D1* is  given  by (1)  evaluated  at  N*.  The  left  hand side  of (9)  is  the
value  of the  creditors  assets  before  the  buyback,  while  the  right  hand  side
expresses  the  value  of their  assets  after  the  whole  operation  is  completed.  In
addition  to the  value  of remaining  debt  f(D 1*),  the  creditors  receive  a net
amount  (a  +  N*  - p).  When  a  exceeds  p(a),  the  private  lenders  gain,  so that,
if  required,  they  are  willing  to  pay  a  positive  price  for  debt  reduction.  The
amount  of  new  money  necessary  for  creditors  to retain  no net  increase  in the
value  of their  portfolios  is  positive.  There  is  a solution,  N*  >  0, to
equation  (9)  given  a  whenever  a part  of a  is  spent  on  buybacks.  Denote  this
solution  by N*(a;p),  and  the  associated  ex post  debt level  by D1*(a;p).
The  secondary  price,  p1, with  p1(a,p)  - f(D,*)/D 1*, is  higher  than  po
whenever  N* exceeds  zero.  This  follows  from  the  concavity  of the  debt  value
function,  f(x). 5
5Proof: For  Do  larger  than  zero,  Do  >  f(DO),  so that,  -Do(a-js)  > Nf(DO)  -
D (N+a-p),  for  N > 0.  Adding  Dof(D  ) to  each  side  and  rearranging  terms,  we
obtain  DO[f(DO)  - (a-p)]  >  (Do  +  A) f(DO)  - [(a-p+N)  Do f(DO)]  / f(DO)]-11-
When  debt  reduction  creates  no change  in  the  value  of creditor's
assets, the implicit tax rate imposed on remaining  debt is t - (p 1 - po).  The
capital  gains  realized  by remaining  debt  ho'ders  are  taxed  one  hundred
percent. The capital gain due to debt reduction is 7 - [Do  - (a-p+N)/pO  (p 1 -
po),  and  the  total  tax  revenue,  which  accrues  to the  debtor,  is  A - N(l - pl).
N* is the  solution  to  y - A,  which  is equivalent  to (9).  The  amount  of new
money  required  per  unit  of old  debt  held  back  from  repurchase  is
(10)  n* - N* /  (D 1* - N*)  - (p 1 - po)  /  (1  - pl).
which  is  equivalent  to equation  (4).  Since  the  buyback  occurs  at the  ex  ante
price  po,  the  exiting  creditors  also  break  even.
The  effect  a  on  N* and  Di*  can  be calculated  using  (8)  and (9):
dN*/da  (Po  - f')(l - A')  /  [(1 - po)f'+ (po  - f)p'],  and
dD 1 */da  - (1 - p)(l  - pO) /  [(1 - pO)f'+  (po  0 f'-)J'
where f'  f'(Dl1 *, and  '  p'(a,N*).  When A'  < 1, a rise in a  increases both
N* and  D* until  f'(D*)  =  po.  Further  debt  reduction  beyond  this  point  through
increases  in  a  decrease  the  size  of the  net  resource  transfer.  As long  as the
marginal  value  of debt,  f'(D),  is  below  the  buyback  price,  po,  remaining
debtholders  realize  an increasing  capital  gain  from  further  repurchases.
Therefore,  the  compensating  concession  in  new  money  that  can  be demanded
respecting  the  constraint  that  creditors  are  at least  as  well  off  with  the
> [Do  + N - (a  - p + N) /  po)]  f(D )
using  the  definition  pn  - f(DO)/Do.  Using  equations  (1)  and Y2)  the  last
inequality  becomes  DrjfPD)  > Df(DO),  implying  that  p 1 > pO.-12-
program as the status quo rises with debt reduction.  However, when debt is
reduced far enough so that f'(D) >  p 0, the implicit tax needed to assure that
creditors are indifferent  between selling and holding debt declines  with
further reductions in the debt.
Thus, until debt is reduced to the point that the  marginal secondary
value of debt, f'(D),  equals the buyback price, p 0, the debtor gains both net
resource transfers and debt reduction from further  buybacks. If the objectives
of the donor place weight only on the debtor's  benefits (excluding  any other
objectives, such as the cost of funds), then the optimal amount of remaining
debt for the donor is less than or equal to the solution to f'(D) =  po.
Figure 1 depicts the f(D) curve and initial  value of debt po in the
top  panel. The relationship  between N  and the ex post debt level D* is
portrayed in the lower panel for solutions to equations (8)  and (9). The
maximum amount of new money contributed  by cred..tors  is attained when f'(D) =
p 0. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship  between N*  and the amount of gift
financing a. N* rises as a increases  until the marginal value of debt f'(D)
equals p4,  and then declines towards zero. D is zero when the gift is large
enough to buyback the entire debt Do  at price po,  that is, (a-p)/p.  =  Do.
If the proportion of available funds used to repurchase debt can
change, then an increase in p(a+N) for every value of (a+N)  acts as a decrease
in a. For simplicity,  we analyze  here the  multiplicative case only. Suppose
that p(a +  N)  p.(a  +  N). It is then  possible to show that:
dN*/dp  (f'-  po) (a  +  N) /  [po(p-f')  +  (1 -A)]
dD*/dp =  (1 - po) (a  +  N)/ [po(p-f')  +  (1 - f'I
The denominator is always positive for all p  e  [0,1].  Thus, D* increases with-13-
. Moreover, N* increases in u  as long as f' >  po.
These results partially extend to the case where the funds a are are a
loan rather than a gift. When debt is repurchased with a loan from official
sources, seniority considerations also matter. When all debt, regardless of
the creditor, has equal priority in repayment, the results developed above go
through. The only difference is that when part of the initial transfer is a
loan, less new money is forthcoming than in the pure gift case because the new
loans reduce the ex post debt price. Consequently, less debt reduction can be
achieved for a given transfer. However, when the initial transfer takes the
form of senior debt, it impairs the value of existing debt claims since junior
debt is now serviced only after the senior loan is repaid. In that case, and
in spite of the gains that are due to debt reduction, the value of private
creditors' assets  is reduced (see the appendix for a treatment of a  as junior
and senior  debt).
In reality, it  is probable that IFIs loans are senior to commercial
loans,  but that they also create efficiency gains due to conditionality (i.e,
they lead to an upward shift in the f(D) curve). The net effect of those loans
on the payoffs of commercial creditors can then  be positive. The menu approach
can help ensure that those net benefits are taxed so that the debtor country
can retain a larger share of the efficiency gains due to conditionality.
5.  Underfunded  Menus
When private creditors commit ex ante to choose between selling back
debt and holding onto debt claims with an obligation to make new loans, an
equilibrium debt reduction program that leaves commercial  banks at their
status quo payoff levels does not require that the ex post choice of each
creditor from the menu be negotiated and specified  or even that  aggregate
constraints be placed on the total amounts of debt reduction and new money.
Prices, that is, the offer of po  for debt  bought back and any ratio of new-14-
loans  to remaining  debt  claims  required,  n (with  n<n),  are  sufficient.
On the  other  hand,  given  available  resources  a, it is  possible  to  pick
an n that  will  lead  in  equilibrium  to  an allocation  that  costs  exactly  a: that
is,  for  any  amount  of  resources,  a, and  buyback  price  po  in the  simple  model,
there  is  a solution  for  n.  With a  competitive  equilibrium  in the  debt  market,
the  outcome  that  can  be computed  given  the  function  f(D)  and  the  prices  p0 and
n is  attainable.
Selecting  the  appropriate  value  of n to assure  that  the  defined  amount
of  debt  reduction  is  achieved  in  equilibrium  requires  knowledge  of the  debt
value  function,  f(D).  If  there  is  uncertainty  about  f(D),  then  setting  n leads
to  a random  amount  of  debt  reduction  (and  consequent  demand  for  buybacks).
Given  p0 and  n, there  still  need  be no windfall  gain  to creditors,  but the
amount  of resources  required  of the  donor  or lender  is  uncertain.  If  n turns
out  to  be too  low,  only  a portion  of  a  will  be used,  but  creditors  will  remain
at their  status  quo  payoff  level.  However,  if  n turns  out  to  be too  large,  a
will  not  be sufficient  to  buyback  all  the  tendered  debt.  The possible
responses  in that  case  are  to increase  a, to lower  n in  a second  round  offer,
or to  ration  buybacks  using  some  reallocation  mechanism.
In the  latter  case,  creditors  will  suffer  a loss  compared  to their
status  q-o  payoffs.  As a result,  they  will  have  to  be compensated  ex  ante  for
this  eventuality  with  a higher  p and/or  a lower  n. To see  that,  suppose  that  a
menu (p,  n) is  offered,  but that  it is  known  in advance  by all  the
participants  that  the  country  is  only  prepared  to  spend  a smaller  amount  6 <
a. In that  case,  an equilibrium  will  not  exist.  Instead,  all  banks  will  prefer
to  exit  rather  than  to relend.  Remember  that  for  an equilibrium  to  exist,
sufficient  funds  are  needed  for  buybacks  so that  the  ex post  debt  price  p1 is
driven  up to the  point  where  relending  is as  desirable  as exit.  When the  funds
available  to  support  the  equilibrium  are  insufficient,  p 1 does  not  rise-15-
sufficiently  and  relending  at  price  n is  not  as desirable  as  exit;  equation
(4)  will  hold then  as an inequality.
With insufficient  funds,  a  distribution  mechanism  is  needed  to
allocate  the  scarce  buyback  resources.  For  example,  buybacks  can  be
distributed  on a pro-rata  basis.  If  all  banks  are  similar,  they  all  end  up
with  a similar  mix  of cash  and  new loans,  per  unit  of old  debt.  Given  n, what
is the  lowest  exit  price  that  the  debtor  can  now  offer  in  order  to  keep  the
banks  at their  initial  status  quo  payoff  level?  The final  allocation  must
produce  a value  equal  to  p0, per  unit  of old  debt.  Since  relending  is  not  as
desirable  as exiting,  the  exit  price,  p, must  now  be larger  than  po  in  order
to  produce  a  mix  with  a value  of p 0.
However,  there  are  two  major  reasons  why  an underfunded  deal  is not  in
the  interest  of the  debtor  country.  First,  it is  makes  it  more  difficult  for
the  debtor  to capture  all  of the  creditors  surplus.  In effect,  it  is necessary
to  estimate  correctly  the  ex post  price  p 1 in  order  to  built  relending/exit
mixes  that  have  value  p 0. On the  other  hand,  a program  that  is  adequately
funded  preserves  the  status  quo  as long  as  p is  set  equal  to  p 0, even  when
f(D)  is  not  known.  The  only  disadvantage  of not  knowing  exactly  f(D)  is to
render  the  cost  of the  program  is  uncertain.
Second,  adequately  funded  menus  allow  the  debtor  to discriminate
better  between  different  types  of creditor  banks.  But  as discussed  in  the  next
section,  banks  are  in  reality  heterogeneous.  Because  equilibrium  deals  allow
banks  to  choose  themselves  from  the  menu  the  options  that  they  value  most
while  ad-hoc  distribution  mechanisms  do not,  they  allow  the  debtor  to  reap
efficiency  gains.
6.  Heterogeneous  Banks
In the  analysis  above,  we assumed  that  each  creditor  bank  valuation  of
country  debt  depends  on aggregate  debt  outstanding  only,  but  that  it is-16-
independent  of the quantity of debt held in its own portfolio. This implicitly
assumes that the standard capital asset equilibrium mode'l  applies: that is,
the secondary debt market is competitive and efficient,  banks are risk averse
institutions,  country debt is spanned by the universe of existing assets, and
regulatory  considerations do not influence debt  valuation. In equilibrium, the
demand for LDC debt is infinitely  elastic as the marginal and average
valuations of debt claims are equalized across all banks.
However, commercial banks' relative  valuation of the exit and
relending options may differ due to differences in expectations, in
characteristics of their balance sheets, and in the regulatory, tax and
accounting systems  within which they operate. But with a competitive and
efficient secondary debt market, and when country debt is spanned by the
universe of existing securities, differences in expectations alone cannot
explain the existence of a surplus over the secondary market price since those
differences can be intermediated  through the secondary market. 6
However, differences in regulatory  treatment of debt results in
valuations that are different despite the existence of a competitive market.
Due to mispriced deposit insurance,  banks gain by increasing leverage as much
as possible (see  Merton [1977],  Sharpe [19781,  Kane [1985]).  While leverage is
limited by capital adequacy requirements,  book value application of those
requirement create extra value for claims  whose real value has fallen  below
book value. In effect, claims that are entered on the books at a premium over
their real value allow banks to over-represent their own capital. As a result,
banks holding such claims can increase  their effective leverage above the
allowed book leverage. Therefore,  banks that sell inherited debt that is
6In contrast, with incomplete  markets, the  banks' demand function slopes down.
Differences among banks imply that their own valuation of debt held is not the
same in equilibrium. In such a case, choices over a menu of options can
differ, despite the fact that the marginal valuations of all banks are equal.-17-
treated at par by regulators lose  valuable rights to excess leverage. Since
the FDIC insurance subsidy (and  thus excess leverage) is  more valuable to weak
institutions,  the loss incurred  by selling debt at a discount is proportional
to the selling  bank's financial strength. Thus, choice over a menu will
differ,  with relatively stronger banks exiting, and relatively weaker banks
relending (see Demirguc-Kunt  and Diwan [1990]  for such a model).
Note that the market does not intermediate these differences in
valuation away. The market price is simply the price at which the strongest
bank is willing to exit. The weaker banks however would lose if they exited at
that price. In such a framework, it can be shown that a single buyback price
has to be high enough to convince the marginal bank to exit. Stronger banks
also exit and gain. Weaker banks relend and gain. As a result, a menu cannot
extract all of the creditors' surplus (see  Diwan and Spiegle for an analysis).
Heterogeneous creditors are likely to possess private information
about their  marginal valuation of debt. An auction can serve to reveal this
information so that the single buyback price and single linear new money tax
may not equivalent to other methods of implementation in the presence of
asymmetric intormation.  Different implementation  mechanisms can achieve
different results in taxing  creditors' rents differentially,  and supply
constraints can result in efficiency losses.  Also, more gains can be achieved
by extending the menu. For example then banks may have different preferences
over the timing of uncertain payments. In this  case, more instruments are
needed for the new money options. Similarly,  when tax considerations and bank
regulation impose  different costs on banks that depend on the timing of the
realization of losses, different exit options are needed. Those extensions are
left for subsequent  work.
7. Evaluation of the Nexico 1990 deal
We now apply the above analysis to the case of the recent Mexican debt-18  -
agreement.  First,  we describe  the  deal.  Second,  we verify  whether  the  actual
bank  choices  resulted  in  an  equilibrium  as predicted  by equation  (4).  We then
discuss  whether  Mexico  could  have  achieved  a  better  deal.  We note  at the
outset  that  our  computations  below  are  illustrative.  They  indicate  orders  of
magnitude  rather  than  exact  values  as second  order  effect  are  often  ignored.
The  Deal
Mexico  and  the  steering  committee  of its  creditor  banks  negotiated  for
approximately  4  months.  On  July 23,  an  agreement  was  reached  on a package  that
covers  about  $48.9  billion  in  medium-term  and  long-term  debt.  It  offers
commercial  banks  a  menu  of three  options:
1. a  discount  bond:  a 30  year  bond  with  a discounted  principal  of 65%  of the
face  value  of existing  debt  and  an interest  rate  of LIBOR  plus 13/16;
2. a  par  bond:  a  bond  with  no discount  but  a low  interest  rate  of 6.25%
fixed  for  the  lifetime  of the  bond;  and
3.  a new  money  package:  25  percent  of exposure  (7%  of  principal  balance  at
the  conclusion  of the  agreement  and  6% in  1990,  1991  and  1992),  at an
interest  rate  of  LIBOR  plus  13/16.7
The  principal  of  both  bonds  is  guaranteed  through  collateralization  of
a 30-year  zero-coupon  bond (US-Treasury  or its  equivalent  in  case  of other
currencies)  and  18  months  of inteiest  payment  are  guaranteed  on a rolling
basis  through  an  escrow  account.  In  addition,  both  bonds  include  a recapture
clause  which  stipulates  that,  in  case  the  oil-price  increased  by a certain
percentage  in  the  years  1997  and  beyond,  that  the  creditors  would  share  in the
increased  revenue  stream.  The  agreement  also  contained  a financing  facility
contingent  on oil  prices.8
7Note  that  the  present  value  of  the  new  money  call  is  approximatively  given  by
4.07  +  (.06/1.1)  +  (.06/1.1)  +  (.06/1.1)  - .21.
The agreement  further  specified  a certain  number  of relending  options,  in
which  banks  would  be allowed  to  relend,  up to  a certain  maximum  fraction,
their  claims  to  Mexican  public  companies.  In  addition,  banl.s  participating  in-19-
In total  an amount  of $7  billion  have  been  used  for  debt  and  debt
service  reduction,  of  which  $5.757  billion  were  available  from  new  loans  from
the  World  Bank,  IMF,  and  Japan,  and  $1.243  billion  from  Mexico's  own  reserves.
The  choices  made  by banks  in  early  March  were the  following:  46.7
percent  of the  debt  was swapped  into  the  par  bond;  40.2  was -wapped  into  the
discount  bond;  and  13.1  percent  contributed  new  money.  Total  new  money
amounted  to $1.602  billion.  Since  Mexico  provided  $1.243  billion  to finance
the  debt  exchange,  it  was  able  to secure  on  a net  basis  $360  million  of  new
liquidity.9  In terms  of  our  model,  we have:  a  - 5.757  billion;  a  - .36.
Evaluation
The  agreement  effectively  dealt  with free  riding  incentives  in the
sense  that  non-exiting  banks  have to  contribute  with  new  money.  An important
part  of the  agreement  was  the  explicit  rewriting  of the  existing  debt
contracts  so that  the  previous  agreements,  both  between  the  debtor  and  the
creditors  and  among  creditors,  are  not  longer  binding.  The  major  implication
of this  so called  "novation"  is that  debt  which  is  exchanged  into  the  new
instr ients  (including  some  of the  new  money  provided)  would  no longer  be
subject  to  the  sharing  clauses.  This  drastically  reduced  the  problem  of free-
riders  since  they  are  not  able  to  share  equally  in  payments  made  by  Mexico  on
its  restructured  debt.  For  instance,  in  case  Mexico  would  pay in  full  on the
new instruments,  but  would  not  pay  in  full  on  debt  which  was  not  exchanged,
the  holders  of the  non-exchanged  debt  would  not  be able  to  share  in the
payments  the  holders  of the  new instruments  receive.  The "novation"  clause
gave  claim  holders  a greater  incentive  to accept  one  of the  three  options.
the  debt  relief  are  eligible  to  participate  in  a debt-for-equity  swap  program
of at  most $1  billion  per  year.  The  program  would  involve  public  sector
companies  being  privatized  and  qualified  infrastructure  projects.
9For  additional  details  on the  agreement,  see  Lamdany  (1989)  and  especially,
van  Wijnbergen  (1990).-20-
However. one problem with the way in which the deal was structured is
that the relative prices of the three options were predetermined and no single
price was allowed to be determined in a competitive fashion.10  In our model, n
is unique (in  equilibrium) given po and a. Fixing n in the agreement is
acceptable if correctly chosen. However, if  an incorrect  n is chosen, a  needs
to be adjusted ex post. It seems that due to the difficulty of estimating the
f(D) curve, n was fixed too high given the available resources.  As a result,
additional financing  had to be sought in order to complete the deal.
Analysis
Instead of being bough back as assumed in the model, old debt was
exchanged for newJ  bonds, a mix of pure Mexican debt claims and riskless
collateral. In order to analyze the deal, we need first undo the complex
financial  arrangement. As the deal eliminated one class of debt claims and
created several new ones,  we must carefully define our unit of pure Mexican
risk. In the sequel, we define debt prices as the price of an unsecured 30
years bond with a coupon rate of LIBOR+13/16."1  As in our model, we denote by
p the buyback price, and by pl, the ex post debt price.
To compute the implicit  price of pure Mexican debt, we use market
information  on the discount bond.  12  Each discount  bond is a mixture of pure
Mexican risk valued at pl,  and collateral, c.  13  For a $100 loan, it can be
calculated that the value of the collateral is about c =  $24.278 (7.785 for
the principal, 12.29 for the 18 month interest,  and $2 for the recapture
value  4).  Stripping the 18 month interest  payments and the  principal, we are
10The  main reason  being that  US regulators  may have obliged banks to set
reserves according to their bid price rather than to their accepted price.
1 This can be compared with the pre-deal secondary  market debt prices which
were computed in a very similar fashion.
12 Using the price of the par bond to extract the needed informastion is more
problematic  due to the fact that it offers a fix interest rate.
For a discussion of equivalences  between buybacks and debt exchanges, see
Lamdany and Underwood (1989)  and Claessens and Diwan (1990).
14See  The value of the recapture clause is calculated  by Claessens and van-21-
left  with less  than  our  yardstick  of  Mexican  risk,  more  precisely,  with  about
.788  of a standard  pure  Mexican  loan.
The  post-deal  price  of  pure  Mexican  risk,  p1, can  now  be calculated
using  the  technique  outlined  above.  After  the  completion  of the  deal,  the
discount  bond  price  stabilized  at 65  cents,  implying  that  p-  52 [(65  -
24.28)/.788].
The  implicit  buyback  price  p can  also  be approximated  from  the  trading
price  of the  discount  bond.  Since  a unit  of  old  debt  was  exchanged  for .65
units  of the  exit  bond,  old  debtholders  were  given  a  value  of 42 cents
(.65*.65).'5
What  was  the  status  quo  price  before  the  deal  was  achieved?  Using  an
estimate  of the  debt  value  curve  f(D),  and  given  that  at the  time  of the
agreement,  Mexico  had  $107  billion  of mtedium  and  long  term  debt  outstanding
and  its  export  were  estimated  at $28  billion,  we can  predict  that  the
equilibrium  secondary  market  value  for  Mexican  debt  of 38  cents  (see  appendix
2).  This is  in line  with the  observed  market  prices  before  the  announcement  of
the  deal.  Prices  in  the  secondary  market  were in  fact  quite  volatile  in the
period  leading  to the  Brady  speech  and  the  beginning  of the  Mexican  debt
negotiation,  fluctuating  between  35  cents  and  40 cents.  Thus,  the  price  jump
to  p1 .52,  in the  order  of 37  percent  was  remarkably  large.
Did  the  creditors  anticipate  this  price  jump?  Evidence  can  be gathered
using  the  equilibrium  condition  in (4).  Given  that  banks  were free  to  choose
between  the  options  that  were  offered,  if the  banks  correctly  anticipated  the
amount  of debt  reduction,  the  ex  post  price  p,  should  have  obeyed  the  equation
p,  - (p  +  n) /  (1  +  n) - (.42  +  .21)/ (1.21)  =  .52 (see footnote 6). Somewhat
surprisingly,  the  answer  thus  seems  to  be that  the  market  ieacted  in an
Wijnbergen  (1 989j
15Using  a different technique, Lamdany (1990)  finds a similar value.-22-
extremely  rational  fashion.
We can  now  compute  the  implied  amotnts  of debt  reduction  and  new  money
achieved  in the  deal.  This  is  not  an easy  matter  because  the  exit  and  discount
bonds  are  a mixture  of  buybacks  and  relending  (since  the  collateral  has  been
spent,  the  collateralized  portion  corresponds  to  an implicit  buyback).  But  we
can  use  shortcuts.  The  remaining  nominal  debt  claims  (in  terms  of  old  debt)
are  given  by equation  (12':  D 1 - 48.9  - (5.397  +  Ll)/.42  +  N. From  equation
(14),  n  - N/(D 1 - N)  - .21.  We can  solve  those  two  equations  to get:  D 1 -
$29.066  billion  and  N - $5.057  billion.
Let  us check  the  consistency  of  our  estimates.  The  menu  must  have
ensured  that  all  creditors  retained  a  value  of  p - .42  per  unit  of old  debt,
irrespective  of  whether  they  exited  or  relent.  The  capital  gain  of the
creditors  that  stayed  in  that  was  due  to  to debt  reduction  is  y  - (D 1 - N)(p,
- p)  - (29  - 5)(.52-.42)  =  $2.4  billion.  On the  other  hand,  the  tax  revenue  to
Mexico  from  the  new loans  those  creditors  had  make  to is given  by:  A - N (1  -
p 1) - 5(1  - .52)  - $2.4  billion.  So  indeed,  they  just  broke  even  and  got  as
much  as those  that  exited,  i.e  42 cents  on the  dollar.
We can  compute  now the  characteristics  of the  deal:  $24.89  billion  of
old  nominal  debt  claims  were  bought  back (5.397  +  5.057)/.42),  leading  to  a
net  debt  reduction  of (old  nominal)  commercial  debt  claim  of $19.8  billion
(24.89-5.057).
Before  the  deal,  the  market  value  of Mexico  treatable  debt  was  about
$18.6  billion  [48.9  *  .38].  After  the  deal  was  completed,  the  value  of its
remaining  commercial  debt  evaluated  at the  new (and  higher)  debt  price  was
about  $15.114  billion  [29.006  *  .52].  The  value  of its  debt  was thus  reduced
by $3.468  billion.  Mexico  also  retained  $.36  billion  in liquidity,  for  a total
value  of $3.83.  Compare  that  with the  IFIs  contribution  of $  5.8  billion.-23-
$1.95  billion  have  disappearedl  This  is in  fact  the  banks  gain  over  their
status  quo  payoffs.
A deal  that  would  have  left  the  banks  at their  status  quo  payoff  level
should  have  set  p0 at about  38  cents.  Therefore,  the  implicit  buyback  price  of
42 cents  increesed  the  payoff  of the  banks  by about  4 cents (.42  - .38]  per
unit  of  old  debt,  for  a total  of about  $1.95  billion  [48.9  *  .04].  Thus,  of
the  5.78  billion  contributed  by the  IFIs,  Mexico  retained  3.5  billion  (or  66
percent),  and  the  banks  $1.9  billion  (34  percent).
Finally,  we check  that  our  technique  that  reduce  the  deal  into  its
basic  components  is relevant.  Under  our  interpretation,  each  new  bond  offered
is  part  exit  and  part  new  money.  Consider  the  discount  bond for  example.  One
dollar  of old  debt  was  swapped  for .65  discount  bond.  Since  there  is  $.243  of
collateral  in  each  discount  bond,  a dollar  of old  debt  received  $.157  in
quasi-cash  (.65*.243).  It  also  received  a  claim  worth  $.512  in  old  debt  units
(.65*.788).  Is this  mix  consistent  with the  menu (p-.42,  n-.21)  ?
From  the  $.512  of debt  received  by each  old  claim,  .089  must  have  been
the  required  new  loan,  and  $.423  the  old  debt (check  that .423*1.21=.512).
Since  the  old  debt  retained  is  $.423,  $.576  of  old  debt  must  have  been  bough
back for  an amount  of $.242  (.577*.42).  Therefore,  an  holder  of an  old  unit  of
debt  received  $.242  for  the  buyback  portion  of the  deal,  and  he contributed
$.089  for  the  new  money  portion.  Thus  on net,  he received  $.153.  This is
indeed  very  close  to  the  quasi-cash  received  of $.157  computed  above.
8.  Concluding  Reuarks
When sovereign  debt  trades  at a discount  on  secondary  markets,  a
market  buyback  leads  to  an increase  in  the  secondary  market  price.  The  wealth
of private  creditors  increases  because  part  of the  funds  used  in the  buyback
is  a transfer  payment  to them.  When  banks  are  homogeneous  banks,  we show  how-24-
the  inclusion  of  an exit  option  and  a new  money  option  in  a menu  of options
fram  which  the  private  creditors  freely  choose  can  eliminate  the  wealth
transfers  due  to the  debt  reduction.  It  is  sufficient  to  set the  buyback  price
equal  to the  ex ante  status  quo  price.  Any  new  money  call  will  do the  job.  In
equilibrium,  creditors  will  provide  enough  new  money  to  stabilize  the  ex post
debt  price  at a level  that  leave  then  indifferent  to the  exit  option.  The
important  effect  of increasing  the  new  money  call  is to  reduce  the  cost  of the
menu  and  the  extent  of debt  reduction  achieved.
The  menu  approach  we describe  does  not  require  assignments  of
particular  choice  form  the  menu  to  each  lenders.  Rather,  it  implements  debt
reduction  through  a  price  system,  allowing  different  creditors  to select
different  portfolio  in  equilibrium  from  a common  set  of options.
However,  with  heterogeneous  banks,  some  transfer  of resources  will  occur  when
participation  in  the  debt  reduction  plan is  voluntary  and  the  buyback  price
will generally  need  to  be above  the  pre-buyback  price.
To illustrate  some  of  our  results,  we analyze  the  recent  Mexican  debt
agreement.  We show  how to  read  through  the  complex  financial  acrobatics  to
estimate  the  extent  of net  debt  reduction  achieved.  We show  that  the  funds
provided  by IFIs  benefited  both  Mexico  and  its  creditors.  Mexico  retained
about  62  percent  of that  transfer,  and  the  banks  34  percent.
When  creditors  are  heterogeneous  and  possess  private  information  about
the  value  of debt  reduction  to them,  a  mechanism  is  needed  to  elicit  that
information.  Important  topics  for  future  research  include  analyses  of  how a
menu  can  be combined  with  an auction  over  new  money  or exit instruments  to
induce  revelation,  and  of the  efficiency  of various  possible  implementation
mechanisms  in the  presence  of  market  distortions  and  with  heterogeneous
creditors.-25-
Appendix  1
The  case  with  Nultilateral  Loans
Consider the possibility that debt is repurchased  with a loan from
official sources  with an interest in  providing debt reduction and new
liquidity. We first consider the case in which all debt, regardless of the
creditor, has equal priority in repayment. That is, a government or IFI does
not possess legal seniority  privileges vis-a-vis private creditors; this
institutional  assumption is ad hoc. For simplicity,  we only analyze the
special case that the entire new money tax is  used for domestic absorption.
A loan can be made by the third  party in several ways, one of which is
equivalent to the provision of private new money. The loan amount, L, can be
provided in exchange for a debt obligation of face value, L. Therefore, the
expected present value of the acquired debt is less than L, and the agency is
part donor. Another extreme is that the nominal debt obligation exceeds L by
the discount on debt, so that the expected present value of the new debt
obligation is equal to the amount paid, !.  In the absence of seniority
differences between the agency and private creditors, additional debt bought
at the secondary  market discount using the latter type of loan can never
achieve debt reductions if  private creditors are not forced to accept losses.
This is easily seen by noting that the reduction in private debt is made up
one for one with new debt. Any new money tax imposed  on private creditors
results in an ex ante appropriation of their  wealth.
New money in the form of thr former "donor" loan can yield both debt
reduction and more private loans. Suppose that the new loans (L+N)  are
entirely used to buyback debt, with L being a new debt obligation for the
borrower. Private creditors  are indifferent  between the status quo and
equilibrium debt reduction  under the menu if the following equation holds:
f(Do)  + N* - pi [D 1* - L] +  L +  N*  (Al)
with  D1*  Do  + N* + L - (L + N*)/p  (A2)
and where p1 - f(D 1*)/D,*.  The right  hand side of (Al) is the value of the
assets held by all private creditors ex post. It also expresses the point that
the ex ante price of debt, f(Di*)/Di*,  equals the ex post price minus the tax
imposed through new loan commitments. Setting the buyback price equal to po  =
f(DO)  /  D.,  there is a positive solution N* to equation (Al) for concave
functions, f(x). Creditors  will be indifferent  between selling debt claims at
the ex ante price and holding them  with the commitment to provide a
proportionate share of the equilibrium  new money.
The effect of an increase in L on the extent of debt reduction  and net
resource transfer to the debtor is easily calculated using (Al) and (A2):
8N*/OL  - [po  (1  - p1)  /  (1  - po)  rI]  - 1
and  aDl*/aL-  -(1  - p 1) / n  <  0
where  H  - (1 - L/Di*)f'(Di*)  +  (L/D 1*)pI
Comparison with the gift case in section 4 reveals that  when part of
the initial transfer is a loan, less new money is forthcoming than in the pure-26-
gift  case  because  the  new  loans  reduce  the  ex-post  debt  price.  Consequently,
less  debt  reduction  can  be achieved  for  a given  transfer.
Senior  Loams  by the  IFIs
Without  presuming  that  IFI  debt is  senior  to  private  debt,  we explore
the  effect  that  such  seniority  privileges  would  have if the)  exist.  Suppose
that  a new  IFI  loan  is senior  to  private  debt.  Let  L be the  amount  of  new
funds  provided  by the  IFI,  and  assume  that  the  face  value  of the  debt
purchased  equals  L. In this  case,  the  IFI  loan  impairs  the  value  of existing
debt  claims.  After  a senior  IFI  loan,  L, is  made,  the  value  of private  debt
becomes  [f(D+L)  - f(L)]  which  equals  the  present  value  of debt  claims,  D,  when
they  are  only  serviced  after  the  loan  of size  L is repaid.
Suppose  that  L is  used  to  repurchase  debt,  and  that  no  new  money  is
required.  That is,  commitment  by private  lenders  is  not  assumed,  so that  they
just  hold  out  for  the  ex post  price.  The  buyback  price,  p 1 is  given  by:
p1 - [f(D  +  L - B) - f(L)] /(D - B).  (A3)
The  amount  of the  loan  used  for  buybacks  is  p  B. Suppose  that  all  of  L is  used
for  buybacks,  then  in  equilibrium,  B solves  the  following  equilibrium
condition
L/B - [f(D  +  L - B) - f(L)] /  (D - B),  (A4)
yielding  the  sclution  p1*. Since  f(x)  is concave,  this  has  a solution  for  L  <
B, if 0  <  L <  D.
Figure  3a depicts  an  equilibrium  price  when  a buyback  is financed  by a
senior  IFI  loan.  The  amount  of the  loan  used  to repurchased  B units  of  debt is
shown  on the  right  hand  side  of the  figure  as  pjB.  For  the  values  of p1 and  B
shown,  the  demand  for  buybacks  does  not  use  up  all  of the  loan  L.  When  all  of
L is  used to  repurchase  debt,  the  equilibrium  values  of B  and  p 1 are larger,
so that  pjB  equals  L.  Figure  3b shows  the  effect  of  dilution:  po  is the  price
of  private  debt  before  the  senior  loan  is  made  and  p1* is  the  ex post
equilibrium  price.
Comparison  of the  ex post  equilibrium  price  paid  in  a  buyback  to the
ex  ante  price  (before  the  senior  loan  is  made)  shows  that  the  value  of private
creditors'  assets  is  reduced  and  the  present  value  of all  expected  debt
repayments  f(D  +  L - B),  falls.  Letting  L/B  equal  the  ex  post  price,  p,
equation  (A4)  implies  the  solution  for  p:
p - [f(D  +  L - L/p) - f(L)] /  (D - L/p)  (AS)
Note that  as  pD approaches  L (all  private  debt  is  repurchased),  the  right  hand
side  remains  less  than  unity,  in  contrast  to the  case  of equal  seniority.
Therefore,  a solution  to  equation  (AS)  exists  for  p and L  such  that  all  the
private  debt  is repurchased  and  the  ex post  debt  burden,  L, is smaller  than  D.
This  reduction  in  the  expected  present  value  of debt  repayments  is  financed  by
the  dilution  of the  private  creditors'  debt  claims  caused  by the  senior  loan.
The  difference,  r(C)  - f(L),  is the  net  transfer  from  private  creditors  to the
debtor;  this  is  a transfer  of future  rather  than  current  resources.
To further  illustrate  the  dilution  effect  of an increase  in  senior-27-
debt,  suppose  that  private  creditors  are  offered  the  ex ante  secondary  market
price,  p0 in  the  buyback  (say  for  political  reasons).  From  equation  A5, if  the
repurchase  price  is  set  to  p0 - f(D)/Do  on the  right  hand  side,  then  the
solution  for  the  export  secondary  market  price  of private  debt (appearing  on
the  left  hand  side)  is less  than  p0 for  a  senior  IFI  loan,  L less  than  f(DO).
Remaining  private  creditors  suffer  a capital  loss  and  prefer  to sell  back
debt.  An equilibrium  buyback  price  such  that  creditors  are indifferent  at the
margin  between  selling  and  retaining  debt  is lower  than  the  initial  price  p0.
Appendix  2
The  Debt  Value  Curve  and the  Debt  Reduction/New  Money  Frontier
Conceptual  models  as well  as  empirical  observations  support  the  view
that--holding  everything  else  constant--the  market  value  of debt  will fall
short  of its  face  value  at  an increasing  rate  as indebtedness  increases.  This
is  reflected  in the  decrease  in  the  unit  price  of debt  as indebtedness
increases.  Several  empirical  studies  have  measured  this  relationship  by
estimating  price  equations  (Claessens  (1988),  Purcell  and  Orlanski  (1988),
Sachs  and  Huizinga  (1988),  and  Vatnick  (1988)).  Some  of these  papers  use
regressions  of the  log  of price  on the  log  of  debt  ratio  and  other
conditioning  variables.
We prefer  to  use  here  a logistic  form which  does  not  force  the
elasticity  to  be the  same  at all  levels  of  D (see  Cohen  [1989]  and  Claessens,
Diwan,  Froot  and  Krugman  [1990]).  The  resulting  price  equation  (estimated
using  a cross-section  of 35  countries)  is  given  by:
ln [  p /  (1 - p) ]  =  7.88 - 1.41.ln(D/X)
where  D/X  stands  for  the  debt  to  exports  ratio.
At the  time  of the  agreement,  Mexico  had  $107  billion  of  medium  and
long  term  debt  outstanding  and its  export  were  estimated  at $28  billion.
Plugging  these  values  into  the  equation  above  predicts  a secondary  market
value  for  Mexican  debt  of 38  cents.  This  is in  line  with  the  observed  market
prices  before  the  announcement  of the  deal  which  fluactuated  between  35  cents
and  40 cents.-28-
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